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Abstract. From 12.11.06 to 17.11.06, the Dagstuhl Seminar 06461 Ne-
gotiation and Market Engineering was held in the International Confer-
ence and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar,
several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work
and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given
during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are
put together in this paper. The ﬁrst section describes the seminar top-
ics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are
provided, if available.
Keywords. Negotiations, Auctions, Decision Support Systems, Soft-
ware Agents, Testbedding Markets
06461 Executive Summary  Negotiation an Market
Engineering
This executive summary sketches the overall theme of the seminar held from
November 12 to 17, 2006, at Schloss Dagstuhl.
Keywords: Negotiations, Auctions, Decision Support Systems, Software Agents,
Testbedding Markets
Joint work of: Jennings, Nicholas R.; Kersten, Gregory; Ockenfels, Axel; Wein-
hardt, Christof
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1010
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A Decision Support System for Market Mechanisms
Choice in e-Procurement
Carsten Block (Universität Karlsruhe (TH), D)
Since the rise of the Internet electronic markets have become an important com-
ponent of e-procurement by bringing together demand and supply. E-markets
are meeting venues for component suppliers and purchasers, who use exchange
mechanisms to electronically support the procurement process. Exchange mech-
anisms can be conceived as market institutions providing sets of rules, which
determine the functioning of the market and the permissible actions such as
bidding deadlines, non-disclosure rules or bid-revocation constraints. In nowa-
days procurement landscape, mechanisms vary from electronic procurement cat-
alogues, where requests and oﬀers are publicly announced, to e-negotiations,
where the participants bargain over the conditions of a trade using electronic
message exchange and / or decision support platforms, to auctions, where one
or two sides automate the process during which participants from the other side
compete against each other (Kersten, Neumann, Vahidov, & Chen, 2006). The
variety of procurement solutions already suggests that there is no single best so-
lution for all imaginable sourcing activities. Instead, some mechanisms like e.g.
an auction might be advantageous in certain situations while others are not (and
vice versa).
In this paper we present a knowledge-based system (KMS) aimed at support-
ing procurement staﬀ in their decision making on which mechanism to choose
best for a speciﬁc sourcing scenario.
Keywords: Negotiation, electronic auction, e-auction, decision support, DSS,
strategic sourcing, SRM, procurement, knowledge base, expert system
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/989
Nonlinear Transaction Pricing in the Securities Trading
Value Chain
Matthias Burghardt (Universität Karlsruhe (TH), D)
Most of the research on transaction costs in the market microstructure literature
focuses on implicit transaction costs. Research on the design of price schedules for
explicit transaction fees is rare. This paper analyzes and classiﬁes diﬀerent price
schedules and discusses their application to the market transaction business. The
discussion highlights design issues and the need for a structured approach for
price schedule design in the context of market engineering.
In order to get some insights into customer order behavior, we conduct a
trading experiment where participants trade virtual stocks on an electronic plat-
form within a time period of three weeks. During three weeks, participants face
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transaction fees of diﬀerent types. Order frequency and volume is measured and
related to the price schedule in place. We ﬁnd that both variables are inﬂuenced
by transaction fees. We also try to identify price elasticities for groups with
diﬀerent income and use this information for a structured approach towards a
nonlinear price schedule design.
Keywords: Nonlinear Pricing, Securities Trading, Exchanges, Transaction Fee
Experiment
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/990
A Comparison Between Mechanisms for Sequential
Compute Resource Auctions
Andrew Byde (HP Lab - Bristol, GB)
This paper describes simulations designed to test the relative eﬃciency of two dif-
ferent sequential auction mechanisms for allocating compute resources between
users in a shared data-center. Speciﬁcally we model the environment of a data
center dedicated to CGI rendering in which animators delegate responsibility for
acquiring adequate compute resources to bidding agents that autonomously bid
on their behalf. For each of two possible auction types we apply a genetic algo-
rithm to a broad class of bidding strategies to determine a near-optimal bidding
strategy for a speciﬁed auction type, and use statistics of the performance of
these strategies to determine the most suitable auction type for this domain.
Keywords: Auction resource allocation
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/991
Negotiation or Auction? The NorA project
Eva Chen, Bo Yu and Klaus Kolitz (Concordia University - Montreal, CA /
Universität Karlsruhe (TH), D)
NorA is a joint project between Concordia University, Canada, and University
Karlsruhe, Germany, through which a group of researchers of Auction and Nego-
tiation meet together in order to deeply investigate the diﬀerences and possible
impacts of the use of diﬀerent electronic market mechanisms. The objective
of the project is to build a comprehensive research framework and knowledge
base from multiple discipline perspectives (e.g. economics, behavioral science,
psychology, information system (IS) research, computer science, etc), through
continuous and accumulative work. The research under this project would bring
valuable knowledge and support to businesses, helping them to do better decision
in transactions, especially in the cyberspace (Malone et al., 1987), whereby the
appropriate use of electronic market transaction system and mechanisms would
further increase social welfare and better satisfy agents with the transaction
process if possible (Smith, 1982).
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Keywords: Negotiation, auction, mechanism, and markets
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/992
Optimal Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Vickrey
Auctions with Perfect Substitutes
Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash , David C. K. Yuen and Nicholas R. Jen-
nings (University of Southampton, GB)
We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in
multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We ﬁrst
consider a model where all other bidders are local and participate in a single
auction. For this case, we prove that, assuming free disposal, the global bidder
should always place non-zero bids in all available auctions, irrespective of the
local bidders' valuation distribution. Furthermore, for non- decreasing valuation
distributions, we prove that the problem of ﬁnding the optimal bids reduces to
two dimensions. These results hold both in the case where the number of local
bidders is known and when this number is determined by a Poisson distribution.
In addition, by combining analytical and simulation results, we demonstrate that
similar results hold in the case of several global bidders, provided that the market
consists of both global and local bidders. Finally, we address the eﬃciency of the
overall market, and show that information about the number of local bidders is
an important determinant for the way in which a global bidder aﬀects eﬃciency.
Keywords: Simultaneous Auctions, Perfect Substitutes, Bidding Strategies,
Vickrey Auction, Multiple Sellers, Market Eﬃciency
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/993
Full Paper:
http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/∼rkd/publications/2006/aamas06.enrico.pdf
Designing Reverse Auctions for B2B Procurement -
Evidence from the German Industry
Tilman Eichstädt (Universität Rostock, D)
For a long time on-line reverse auctions have been proposed as an eﬀective tool
to improve the performance of corporate procurement. Five years after the end
of the Internet and e-business hype, reverse auctions have become a standard
procurement tool for large corporations. However, it has not been assessed as yet
to what extent users actively apply the ﬁndings of auction theory to improve the
design of reverse auctions. Based on a representative survey of companies using
procurement auctions in Germany, the following paper reveals which auction
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designs are used in practice and to what extent more complex and sophisticated
auction designs are adopted. By comparing the empirical results with the con-
cepts of auction theory it is shown which levers can be pulled to improve the
design of an auction. For auctions with many bidders, hybrid auctions seem to
be promising as they can reasonably combine the beneﬁts of diﬀerent standard
auction models. For auctions with only a few bidders, Dutch auctions might be
superior to English auctions as they can create additional uncertainty and in-
duce risk-averse bidders to bid more aggressively. In practice, however, it is very
common that companies use diﬀerent variations of the English auction such as
rank or best/not best auctions rather than Dutch or hybrid auctions. Here it
seems that framing eﬀects rather than game-theoretic factors play an important
role.
Keywords: Auctions, auction design, procurement, hybrid auctions, framing
eﬀects
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/994
Sequential versus Simultaneous Auctions: A Case Study
Shaheen Fatima (University of Liverpool, GB)
Sequential and simultaneous auctions are two important mechanisms for buying
and selling multiple objects. These two mechanisms yield diﬀerent outcomes (i.e.,
diﬀerent surpluses, diﬀerent revenues, and also diﬀerent proﬁts to the winning
bidders). Given this, we compare the outcomes for the sequential and simulta-
neous mechanisms for the following scenario. There are multiple similar objects
for sale, each object is sold in a separate auction, and each bidder needs only
one object. Furthermore, each object has both common and private value com-
ponents and bidders are uncertain about these values. We ﬁrst determine the
equilibrium bidding strategies for each individual auction for the simultaneous
and sequential cases. We do this for the English auction rules, the ﬁrstprice sealed
bid rules, and the second-price sealed bid rules. We then consider the case where
the private and common values have a uniform distribution and compare the
two mechanisms in terms of a bidder's ex-ante expected proﬁt, the auctioneer's
expected cumulative revenue, and the expected cumulative surplus. Our study
shows that, for all the three auction rules, the expected cumulative surplus and
the auctioneer's expected cumulative revenue is higher for the sequential mech-
anism. However, the mechanism that generates a higher ex-ante expected proﬁt
for the bidders depends on the number of objects being auctioned and the num-
ber of participating bidders, and it is sometimes higher for sequential mechanism
and sometimes for the simultaneous one.
Keywords: Multi-object auctions, interdependent valuations, sequential auc-
tions, simultaneous auctions
Full Paper:
http://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/∼shaheen/pubs/icec06.pdf
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Payoﬀ levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in
the Stag Hunt: an experimental study
Nicholas Feltovich, Atsushi Iwasaki and Sobei H. Oda (University of Houston,
USA / Kyushu University, Japan / Kyoto Sangyo University, Japan)
Game theorists typically assume that changing a game's payoﬀ levelsby adding
the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoﬀsshould not aﬀect be-
havior. However, this invariance is an empirical question when "payoﬀs" are
actually money amounts rather than utility amounts. In particular, if individu-
als treat gains and losses diﬀerently, then payoﬀ-level changes may matter when
they result in positive payoﬀs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the
results of a human-subjects experiment designed to test for two types of "loss
avoidance": certain-loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in
favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible-loss avoidance
(avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that
leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of a game
called Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoﬀs, under a variety
of treatments. We ﬁnd diﬀerences in behavior across the three games; these dif-
ferences are hard to detect in the ﬁrst round of play, but grow over time. When
signiﬁcant, the diﬀerences we ﬁnd are in the direction predicted by certain- and
possible-loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple
equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select equilibria in such games.
Keywords: Experiment, game theory, behavioral economics, stag hunt, learning
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/996
Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets
Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash and Nicholas R. Jennings
(University of Southampton, GB)
We consider competition between sellers oﬀering similar items in concurrent on-
line auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such
as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract buyers. We show that there exists
a pure Nash equilibrium in the case of two sellers with asymmetric production
costs. In addition, we show that, rather than setting a reserve price, a seller can
further improve its utility by shill bidding (i.e., pretending to be a buyer in order
to bid in its own auction). But, using an evolutionary simulation, we show that
this shill bidding introduces ineﬃciences within the market. However, we then go
on to show that these ineﬃciences can be reduced when the mediating auction
institution uses appropriate auction fees that deter sellers from submitting shill
bids.
Negotiation and Market Engineering 7
Keywords: Auctions, Competing Sellers, Shill Bidding, Auction Fees, Reserve
Price
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/997
Negotiation Fever: Loss Aversion in Multi-Issue
Negotiations
Henner Gimpel (Universität Karlsruhe (TH), D)
Negotiating parties oftentimes do not reach mutually beneﬁcial agreements. A
considerable body of research on negotiation analysis compiled a set of so called
common biases in negotiations that systematically aﬀect the cognition and be-
havior of negotiators and thereby inﬂuence agreements. The present work adds
an additional eﬀect, the attachment eﬀect. This eﬀect biases decision makers in
bilateral multi-issue negotiations and inﬂuences their preferences via reference
pointsnegotiators get caught in a kind of negotiation fever.
Keywords: Negotiation Analysis, Consumer Preferences, Behavioral Economics,
Experimental Economics, Endowment Eﬀect, Loss Aversion
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/998
A Bayesian Reputation System for Virtual Organizations
Jochen Haller (SAP Research, D)
Virtual Organizations (VOs) are an emerging business model in today's Internet
economy. Increased specialization and focusing on an organization's core compe-
tencies requires such novel models to address business opportunities. In a VO,
a set of sovereign, geographically dispersed organizations temporarily pool their
resources to jointly address a business opportunity. The decision making process
determining which potential partners are invited to join the VO is crucial with
respect to entire VO's success. The possibility of a VO partner performing badly
during the VO's operational phase or announcing bankruptcy endangers the in-
vestment taken in integrating their processes and infrastructure for the purpose
of the VO. A reputation system can provide additional decision support besides
the a priori knowledge from quotations and bidding to avoid events such as VO
partner replacement by helping to choose reliable partners in the ﬁrst place.
To achieve this, reputation, an objective trust measure, is optimally aggregated
from multiple independent trust sources that inherently characterize an orga-
nization's reliability. To allow for the desired predictions of an organization's
future performance, a stochastic modeling approach is chosen. The paper will
present a taxonomy of TIs for VO environments, a stochastic model to maintain
and aggregate trust sources, so called Trust Indicators, and the inclusion of other
subjective measures such as feedback.
8 N. Jennings, G. Kersten, A. Ockenfels and C. Weinhardt
Keywords: Reputation system, Bayes network, trust management, virtual or-
ganisations
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/999
On Comparison of Mechanisms of Economic and Social
Exchanges: The Times Model
Gregory Kersten, Eva Chen, Dirk Neumann, Rustam Vahidov and Christof Wein-
hardt (Concordia University - Montreal, CA / Universität Karlsruhe (TH), D)
An e-market system is a concrete implementation of a market institution; it em-
beds one or more exchange mechanisms. The mechanisms arefrom the economic
point of view-disembodied objects (models and procedures) which control access
to and regulate execution of transactions. E-market systems are also information
systems which are information and communication technologies artifacts. They
interact with their users; have diﬀerent features and tools for searching, process-
ing and displaying information. This work puts forward an argument that the
study of e-markets must incorporate both the behavioural economic as well as
the information systems perspectives. To this end the paper proposes a concep-
tual framework that integrates the two. This framework is used to formulate
a model, which incorporates the essential features of exchange mechanisms, as
well as their implementations as IS artefacts. The focus of attention is on two
classes of mechanisms, namely auctions and negotiations. They both may serve
the same purpose and their various types have been embedded in many e-market
systems.
Keywords: Electronic markets, information systems, exchange mechanisms,
auctions, negotiations, system assessment
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1000
Three Decision-making Mechanisms to facilitate
Negotiation of Service Level Agreements for Web Service
Compositions
Jakub Brzostowski, Mohan Baruwal Chhetri, Ryszard Kowalczyk (Swinburne
Univ. - Melbourne, AU)
The negotiation of Service Level Agreements for composite web services is a
very complex process. It involves the coordination of the negotiation process
so that the end-to-end QoS requirements of the user request are satisﬁed while
ensuring that the atomic QoS requirements are also simultaneously satisﬁed.
This paper summarizes three decision-making mechanisms which support the
process of Service Level Agreement negotiation for composite web services. The
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mechanisms include: the decomposition of the overall user preferences into the
preferences of individual negotiation agents representing each atomic services
within the composition; the selection of the prospective negotiation partners for
the actual interaction from a list of potential service providers and ﬁnally the
negotiation of Service Level Agreement with the selected provider agents while
ensuring that the end-to-end QoS is satisﬁed.
Keywords: egotiation, end-to-end QoS, composite web services
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1001
Prediction Markets: How Do Incentive Schemes Aﬀect
Prediction Accuracy?
Stefan Luckner (Universität Karlsruhe (TH), D)
The results of recent studies on prediction markets are encouraging. Prior ex-
perience demonstrates that markets with diﬀerent incentive schemes predicted
uncertain future events at a remarkable accuracy. In this paper, we study the
impact of diﬀerent monetary incentives on the prediction accuracy in a ﬁeld ex-
periment. In order to do so, we compare three groups of users, corresponding
to three treatments with diﬀerent incentive schemes, in a prediction market for
the FIFA World Cup 2006. Somewhat surprisingly, our results show that perfor-
mancecompatible payment does not necessarily increase the prediction accuracy.
Keywords: Prediction Markets, Incentive Engineering
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1002
Decentralization and Mechanism Design for Online
Machine Scheduling
Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller and Marx Uetz (Maastricht University, NL)
We study the online version of the classical parallel machine scheduling problem
to minimize the total weighted completion time from a new perspective: We
assume that the data of each job, namely its release date rj , its processing time
pj and its weight wj is only known to the job itself, but not to the system.
Furthermore, we assume a decentralized setting where jobs choose the machine
on which they want to be processed themselves.
We study this problem from the perspective of algorithmic mechanism de-
sign. We introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a con-
cept weaker than the dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online
problems. We present a polynomial time, online scheduling mechanism that,
assuming rational behavior of jobs, results in an equilibrium schedule that is
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3.281-competitive. The mechanism deploys an online payment scheme that in-
duces rational jobs to truthfully report their private data. We also show that the
underlying local scheduling policy cannot be extended to a mechanism where
truthful reports constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Keywords: Scheduling, mechanism design, online algorithms
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1003
See also: Published in Algorithm Theory, Springer Lecture Notes Vol. 4059, pp
136-147, 2006
Engineering Grid Markets
Dirk Neumann (Universität Karlsruhe, D)
Grids denote a promising concept to pool computer resources for joint compu-
tations. Facing increasingly more complex and demanding resources, Grids are
deemed the solution to those problems by a more eﬃcient and ﬂexible usage of
already existing resources. From a technical perspective Grid middleware have
made signiﬁcant progress. While in former implementations it was only possible
to share idle resources (e.g. using Condor), new Grid middleware allow advance
reservation of resources that are once committed not usable locally for the com-
mitted time (e.g. GRAM in Globus Toolkit 4.0). Advance reservation thus allows
the sharing of not only idle resources but of all designated resources.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, this paper derives a re-
quirement list stemming from Grid applications that need to be fulﬁlled by the
market-based Grid. Secondly, the paper compares related work with the above
requirements. Thirdly, and most importantly, this paper provides a fully-ﬂedged
market mechanism that is tailored to the use in service-oriented Grids.
Keywords: Market Engineering, Grid Computing, Combinatorial Exchange
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1004
On the Design of Simple Multi-unit Online Auctions
Thomas Kittsteiner, Axel Ockenfels (London School of Economics, GB / Uni-
versität Köln, D)
The increased use of online market places (like eBay) by professional traders
and small businesses goes along with an increase in demand for online multi-unit
auction designs. A seller with many objects for sale might consider it inconvenient
to initiate and monitor a single auction for each individual item and thus might
favour the use of a multi-unit auction. However, the design of online multi-unit
auctions can be substantially more diﬃcult than that of single-unit auctions.
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In fact, the theoretical as well as empirical literature on multi-unit auctions is
much less developed. New diﬃculties such as market power and computational
complexities arise when objects are heterogeneous or bidders demand multiple
items. In addition, there is a conﬂict between simplicity of auction rules and
their eﬃciency (and revenue). If objects for sale are complements, to obtain the
optimal performance (at least from a theoretical point of view) the auction design
usually requires that bidders specify their preferences on any possible package
of the N objects. Thus each bidder has to submit 2N − 1 numbers (as he might
value any subset of the items for sale diﬀerently) . Especially for a large number
of objects such an auction is often infeasible.
Multi-unit auction design is considerably simpler if one can assume that each
bidder just demands one object (or, more generally, if objects are substitutes). As
we will argue below, under this unit-demand assumption, the standard single-
unit auction format used on eBay can be naturally extended to a multi-unit
design.
In what follows we will ﬁrst describe the single-unit auction format used by
eBay and then demonstrate how it can be adjusted to allow for the simultaneous
sale of many objects. We will discuss some of the drawbacks of this multi-unit
design and oﬀer another simple design that can circumvent some of these.
Keywords: Multi-Unit Auctions, Internet Auctions, Market Engineering, eBay
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1005
The Eﬀects of Discrete Bid Levels in Online Auctions
Alex Rogers (University of Southampton, GB)
A key feature of real world auctions that is often neglected in their analysis is
that bids are either restricted to certain discrete levels or a ﬁnite minimum bid
increment is enforced. In this talk we describe the eﬀects that these implemen-
tation details have on the properties of the auction, and in general, we show
that they cause an auction to contravene the Wilson doctrine (i.e. that auction
mechanisms should be detail-free). Thus, an auctioneer attempting to maximise
its revenue must tailor the auction design to ﬁt the environment in which is
ﬁnds itself. We show how an auctioneer can do so by inferring properties of
the bidders that can not be directly observed (e.g. their valuation distribution)
through observations of previous auctions. We then go on to consider how these
implementation details also aﬀect bidders behaviour, and most speciﬁcally, the
phenomenon of sniping in eBay auctions.
References
 David, E., Rogers, A., Schiﬀ, J., Kraus, S., Rothkopf, M. and Jennings, N.
R. (2007) Optimal Design Of English Auctions With Discrete Bid Levels.
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology.
12 N. Jennings, G. Kersten, A. Ockenfels and C. Weinhardt
 Rogers, A., David, E., Schiﬀ, J. and Jennings, N. R. (2007) The Eﬀects of
Proxy Bidding and Minimum Bid Increments within eBay Auctions. ACM
Transactions on the Web.
 Rogers, A., David, E., Schiﬀ, J., Kraus, S. and Jennings, N. R. (2005) Learn-
ing Environmental Parameters For The Design Of Optimal English Auctions
With Discrete Bid Levels, in La Poutré, H., Sadeh, N. and Sverker, J. (Eds.)
Agent-mediated Electronic Commerce, Designing Trading Agents and Mech-
anisms: AAMAS 2005 Workshop, AMEC 2005, Utrecht, Netherlands, July
25, 2005, and IJCAI 2005 Workshop, TADA 2005, Edinburgh, UK, August
1, 2005, Selected and Revised Papers, pp. 1-15. Springer.
Keywords: Auctions, discrete bid, eBay, sniping, optimal
Towards Generic Low Payment Mechanisms for
Decentralized Task Allocation, a Learning Based Approach
Amir Ronen and Rina Talisman (Technion - Haifa, IL)
We study the problem of procuring a cheap path in a disjoint path graph in
which the edges belong to self interested agents. A wide range of task allocation
problems can be reduced to this problem [?]. Motivated by recent negative results
regarding incentive compatible mechanisms for the problem, our focus is on non
incentive compatible mechanisms. Such mechanisms have both good and bad
equilibria and therefore it is not clear how to analyze them.
We take ﬁrst steps towards the construction of generic low payment mech-
anisms for task allocation. We focus on simple mechanisms conveying minimal
amount of information to the agents. By simulation, we investigate the behav-
ior of the agents during repeated executions of the mechanism. We study three
adaptive strategies for the agents, each represents a diﬀerent learning approach.
Our goal is to pinpoint phenomena which are consistent across all three types
of strategies.
We demonstrate that it may be possible to achieve long range payments
overwhelmingly smaller than the payments of incentive compatible mechanisms.
Several recommendations which facilitate obtaining low payments along with
advises for avoiding pitfalls are given as well. We then give a partial theoretical
explanation of the phenomena we are witnessing in the experiments by analyzing
a related random process.
Keywords: Mechanism design, low payment, procurement mechanisms, game
theory, reinforcement learning
Full Paper:
http://iew3.technion.ac.il/∼amirr/talismanRonen.pdf
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Experimental research on bilateral negotiation
Jesus Ríos, Stefan Strecker, JinBeak Kim, Simone Ludwig and Eva Chen (Con-
cordia University - Montreal, CA)
Two hundred undergraduate and graduate students from the two English uni-
versities in Montreal participated in our experiments. Subjects participated in
a contract negotiation between an artist and an entertainment company. They
negotiated as representatives of the respective sides. The contract was comprised
of 4 ﬁxed issues to negotiate: number of promotional concerts, number of new
songs, royalties for CDs and contract signing bonus. Each issue had a ﬁxed num-
ber of options to choose from. A complete oﬀer consists of selecting one option
per issue. In total, there were 240 possible contracts. The experiments were con-
ducted in a lab setting in which the interaction between the negotiation parties
was computer-mediated via a web browser. Each dyad had one hour to negotiate
a contract by exchanging messages and complete oﬀers for acceptance. Partici-
pants were also asked to ﬁll in a pre and post negotiation questionnaire. Each
participant was paid $24 cash for a 3 hours session.
Keywords: Negotiations, decision support
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1006
MACE: A Multi-Attribute Combinatorial Exchange
Björn Schnizler (Universität Karlsruhe (TH), D)
The Grid is a promising technology for providing access to distributed high-end
computational capabilities. Thus, computational tasks can be performed spon-
taneously by other resources in the Grid that are not under the user's control.
However, one of the key problems in the Grid is deciding which jobs are to
be allocated to which resources at what time. In this context, the use of market
mechanisms for scheduling and allocating Grid resources is a promising approach
toward solving these problems. This paper proposes an auction mechanism for
allocating and scheduling computer resources such as processors or storage space
which have multiple quality attributes. The mechanism is evaluated according to
its economic and computational performance as well as its practical applicability
by means of a simulation.
Keywords: Auctions and Bidding, Integer Programming, Combinatorial Ex-
change, Market Engineering, Grid
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1009
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Adopting Agent-Based Situated Decision Support
Framework for Managing One-to-many Negotiations with
Multiple Potential Agreements
Rustam Vahidov (Concordia University - Montreal, CA)
Much eﬀort has been spent in the design and evaluation of agent solutions to au-
tomate one-to-one negotiations. Recently, researchers have been expanding the
agent-based models to address bi-lateral negotiations as well. In this work our
interest is in one-to-many negotiations involving multiple potential agreements.
This may involve selling products or services to customers through deal-making.
The work aims at applying the framework for situated decision support de-
veloped recently to this problem. The major components of situated decision
support system include sensors, eﬀectors, manager, and active user interface.
We illustrate the approach through simulations for the case used previously in
our agent-assisted negotiation experiments.
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Market Engineering: An Interdisciplinary Research
Challenge
Christof Weinhardt and Henner Gimpel (Universität Karlsruhe, D)
Market engineering is making markets work. Markets are information process-
ing and information producing information systems which mediate allocation of
resources within or between organizations. Setting up and operating a market
in a way that it works eﬀectively and eﬃciently is an art and a science. This
paper outlines challenges in this interdisciplinary ﬁeld of research and presents
frameworks for assessing markets.
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